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Refusals to Answer at Oral Deposition:
A "Relevant" Inquiry?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action,"' with a minimum of judicial intervention in the discovery process. Nevertheless, many participants have found the vision of unsupervised yet efficient discovery to be a fleeting mirage
in oral depositions. Much of this problem is caused by attorneys,
who often instruct deponents not to answer questions the lawyers
. ~ Comment outlines the
consider irrelevant to the l a ~ s u i t This
Federal Rules and corresponding judicial interpretations that
govern the taking of depositions, with particular attention on
refusals to answer based on irrelevance, bad faith questioning,
and privilege. The Comment then discusses the proper procedure
to be followed in each instance, and concludes with an admonition that lawyers and judges strictly comply with the Rules in
promoting the efficient use of oral depositions in discovery.

A. The Standard for Relevance
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not clearly indicate
whether an attorney may without sanction instruct a deponent
not to answer questions deemed irrelevant by the attorney. Rule
26(b) defines discoverable information in general:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action . . . . It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible e ~ i d e n c e . ~

Allowing discovery of "relevant" information sets up a standard
similar to that used in trial for evidentiary purpose^,^ although
1. FED.R. CIV.P. 1. See C. WRIGHT,HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS
§ 84,
at 420 (3d ed. 1976).
2. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977). According to
the court, "[C]ounsel for Purina effectively stopped the examination" by repeatedly
objecting to questions asked and instructing the witness not to answer. Id. at 972 & n.lO.
3, FED. R. CIV.P. 26(b)(l). There are special provisions in Rule 26(b) regarding
insurance agreements and trial preparations. They are, however, beyond the scope of this
Comment.
4. See FED.R. EVID.401.
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the last sentence in Rule 26(b)(l) appears specifically to disclaim
that standard. What is seemingly a contradiction is actually the
imposition of two standards, one for discovery and another for
trial. The difference between the two is only a matter of degree.
The Advisory Committee on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery explained:
"Since decisions as to relevance to the subject matter of the action are made for discovery purposes well in advance of trial, a
flexible treatment of relevance is required and the making of
discovery . . . is not a concession or determination of relevance
for purposes of trial."5
The flexible treatment accorded evidence in discovery is well
illustrated by the mandate in Rule 30 that "[e]vidence objected
to shall be taken subject to the ~bjections."~
It is not clear, however, to whom the mandate is directed. Because Rule 30(c) specifies the manner for the recording of depositions, the mandate may
be intended to direct the officer present to record all evidence
given despite a formal objection. On the other hand, it may be
interpreted to direct the witness to answer all questions, even
though a formal objection is made. The courts have recognized
the latter interpretation.

B. Protective Orders
If either a party or a deponent anticipates that a deposition
may involve the party or deponent in "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," he may, under
Rule 26(c), move to limit the scope of discovery.' Upon this motion, the court may issue a protective order limiting the matters
subject to inquiry in the forthcoming depositi~n.~
If a party or
deponent encounters similar annoyance or bad faith once the
deposition has begun, he may, pursuant to Rule 30(d), move to
limit or terminate the depo~ition.~
Both Rule 30(d) and Rule 26(c) incorporate Rule 37(a)(4),
-

-

5 . Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 498 (1970) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as Advisory
Committee Statement].
6. FED.R. CIV. P. 30(c).
7. FED.R. CIV. P. 26(c).
8. Id.
9. FED.R. CN. P. 30(d). As in a Rule 26(c) motion, to prevail the moving party must
show "that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party." Id.
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which provides that a party seeking a protective order may be
required to pay the expenses, including attorneys' fees, of the
opposing party unless the motion was substantially justified. On
the other hand, the party whose actions necessitated the motion
must pay the expenses of the moving party unless his conduct was
substantially justified.1° A strict reading of the Rule forces the
party contemplating the protective order to balance his need for
the order against the possibility that he may be required to pay
for the other party's opposition to the motion.

C. Motion to Compel Answers
If a deponent refuses to answer a question, either on his own
initiative or upon instruction from counsel, the party seeking discovery may move under Rule 37(a)(2) for an order compelling an
answer. If the motion is denied, the court may issue a protective
order.
Not only may a deponent be ordered to answer certain questions, he may also be required to pay the expenses of the motion,
including attorneys' feed2On the other hand, if the moving party
loses, he may be required to pay the expenses of opposing the
motion.13Like a motion for a protective order, Rule 37(a)(4) provides that the court shall award expenses for the motion to compel answers or opposition thereto "unless the court finds that the
opposition to [or making of] the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust."14
Although the rules have long provided for the awarding of
expenses, awards have been relatively rare.15The Advisory Committee for the 1970 changes in the discovery rules expressed hope
that the changes would remedy the judicial reluctance to award
expenses, stating that "expenses should ordinarily be awarded
unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in
carrying his point to ~ourt."~%lthoughthe Advisory Committee
expressly stated that awards of expenses should deter further
10. FED.R. CIV.P. 37(a)(4).
11. FED.R. CIV.P. 37(a)(2). For a general discussion of the necessary procedure in
seeking an order to compel discovery, see Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in
the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1033,1037-38 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Discovery Sanctions].
12. FED.R. CIV.
P. 37(a)(4).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 5, at 540.
16. Id.
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abuses,17one commentator has noted judicial lenity in the application of discovery sanctions. l8 There is, however, an increasing
tendency to recognize the need for deterring future discovery
abuses, and an emerging emphasis on Rule 37(a)(4)as the means
of accomplishing that end?

Generally, attorneys have advanced three justifications for
instructing deponents not to answer questions propounded a t oral
depositions: irrelevance, bad faith, and privilege.

A. Irrelevance
Questions eliciting irrelevant testimony have been more liberally allowed in depositions than at trial.20At trial, irrelevant
evidence is inadrnis~ible.~~
By contrast, irrelevance is not generally a proper basis for refusing to answer questions propounded
at oral deposition^.^^
A leading, recent case in support of the proposition that
counsel may not properly instruct a deponent not to answer a
question on grounds of irrelevance is Ralston Purina Co. v.
McFarland. 23 The case involved the alleged breach of several contracts for delivery of soybeans. On deposition of the principal
witness for the Ralston Purina Co., McFarland's attorney sought
information that would establish a pattern of performance in the
contracts. Counsel for Ralston Purina permitted the witness to
answer partially one question, and then "effectively stopped the
examination" by continually objecting to the questions asked and
instructing the witness not to answer." The trial court denied
McFarland's motion to compel answers under Rule 37(a). Vacating that decision, the Fourth Circuit declared:
Since we cannot guess what answers might have been elicited
from Mr. Wagnon but for counsel's thwarting of the purpose of
17. Id.
18. See Discovery Sanctions, supra note 11, at 1033-34.
19. Id.
20. "Basically the propriety of probing any matter within the knowledge of [a]
deponent is dependent upon relevancy-and relevancy, especially at the pre-trial stage,
is very liberally construed." Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 11 F.R.D. 497, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
21. FED.R. E m . 402.
22. See FED.R. CIV.P. 26(b)(l).
23. 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977).
24. Id. at 972 & n.lO.
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the deposition, we must assume that his answers would have
been beneficial and, if not themselves constituting relevant evidence, might have led to the procuring of such evidence.
The action of plaintiff's counsel in directing Wagnon not to
answer the questions posed to him was indefensible and utterly
a t variance with the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. . . . The questions put to Wagnon were germane to the subject matter of the pending a c t i ~ nand therefore
properly within the scope of discovery. They should have been
answered and, in any event, the action of plaintiff's counsel in
directing the deponent not to answer was highly improper. The
Rule itself says "Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to
the objections . . . ." If plaintiff's counsel had any objection to
the questions, under Rule 30(c) he should have placed it on the
record and the evidence would have been taken subject to such
objection. If counsel felt that the discovery procedures were
being conducted in bad faith or abused in any manner, the
appropriate action was to present the matter to the court by
motion under Rule 3O(d) .25

In another leading case, Shapiro v. Freern~n,~'
a small girl
allegedly suffered permanent psychiatric shock when a private
airplane crashed into the home of her parents. While deposing the
plaintiff's school teachers, defendants sought information regarding her psychological adjustment to school. The plaintiff's attorney objected to nearly all of the questions and instructed the
witness not to answer. Ruling on a motion to compel answers to
the questions, the court found the conduct of the plaintiff's attorney to be wholly improper. Noting the Rule 30(c) mandate that
"[elvidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections,"
the court cautioned: "It is not the prerogative of counsel, but of
the court, to rule on objections. Indeed, if counsel were to rule on
the propriety of questions, oral examinations would be quickly
reduced to an exasperating cycle of answerless inquiries and court
orders."27The court then held that "[counsel] had no right whatever to impose silence or to instruct the witnesses not to ans ~ e r . "The
~ ~crucial consideration is not that discovery of irrele25. Id. a t 973-74 (footnote omitted). See also Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite
& Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446, 450 (D.D.C. 1965) (although objection on ground
of relevancy is proper, instruction not to answer is improper).
26. 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
27. Id. a t 311.
28. Id. a t 312. The court went on to express its displeasure with what i t obviously
viewed as abuse of discovery:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed as an affirmative aid
to substantive justice, and those who choose to read them restrictively do so a t
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vant testimony impedes the judicial process, but rather that
" [tlhe harm caused by being required to take additional depositions of a witness who fails to answer a question based on an
improperly asserted objection far exceeds the mere inconvenience
of a witness having to answer a question which may not be admissible at the trial of the action."29

B. The "Bad Faith" Exception
Although the Federal Rules provide that "[elvidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections," the Rules and
the judicial interpretations recognize an important exception. An
instruction not to answer may be justified in response to questions asked in bad faith or with intent to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or other party.
An argument may be made that despite the liberal construction of "relevancy" for discovery purposes, questions
"unquestionably beyond the scope of the issues of the lawsuit"
should not be answered.30These questions may be viewed as nothing more than one example of conducting the examination "in
such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
deponent or party."31 At least one court has indicated that an
instruction not to answer is proper in the bad faith context.32
However, another court has held that, when confronted with bad
faith questioning, it is not proper for counsel to instruct the deponent not to answer. Rather, counsel should stop the deposition
and apply for a protective order pursuant to Rule 30(d), which is
designed to prevent examinations "conducted in bad faith."%
their peril. It is time that depositions be conducted by members of the bar in a
cooperative manner, in accordance with both the letter and spirit of the rules,
without petty bickering and without intervention by busy courts with more
important matters pressing for attention. It is clear to us that plaintiffs' attorney
has no conception of his obligation to observe the rules "as an officer of the
court" or otherwise. Rather, he appears to be bent on concealing vital facts or,
at best, waging a war of delay, expense, harassment and frustration. There is
no justification for his conduct, no basis at all for his instructing the deponents
not to answer. As a result, the cooperative atmosphere envisaged by the federal
rules has been poisoned by antagonism. Id.
29. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80,84 (W.D. Okla. 1977).The court
also noted, "This seems to be the very purpose of the provisions of Rule 30(c)
. ." Id.
30. Amco Eng'r Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 51, 53 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
31. FED.R. Crv. P. 301d).
32. See Amco Eng'r Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 51, 53 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
33. See Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308,311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).Interestingly, the
Shapiro court noted in dictum that the same procedure should be followed in response to
questions seeking to elicit privileged information. Id.

..

Actually, a combination of both approaches will best produce
the result contemplated by the Federal Rules. If a party or deponent feels that the questioning does demonstrate the requisite
bad faith, refusing to answer the questions is simply a convenient
means of halting the deposition and applying to the court for a
protective order. The party seeking discovery may utilize the hiatus to move to compel an answer. Thus, where the question is
asked to annoy, embanass, or oppress, a deponent arguably may
refuse to answer, especially if he subsequently applies for a protective order.

C. Privilege
Deponents may often be instructed not to answer because the
information sought is privileged. The privilege protection was
explicitly extended to depositions in the 1972 amendment to Rule
30(c), which expressly incorporated the Federal Rules of Evid e n ~ eExplaining
.~~
that change, the notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules observe that "many pertinent topics included
in the Rules of Evidence are not mentioned in Rule 43(b), e.g.
privilege.''35
Although the Advisory Committee notes indicate that the
discovery rules should include the evidentiary protections given
privileged testimony at trial, there is no language in the Federal
Rules expressly authorizing a deponent to refuse to answer a
question on the basis of privilege. Indeed, such a refusal would
apparently contravene the effect of the Rule 30(c) mandate that
"[elvidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections."" Several judicial determinations, however, have focused
on a different approach to questions involving privilege.
~ ' court in dicta
In Preyer v. United States Lines, I ~ C . ,the
specified a different treatment for questions eliciting privileged
testimony than for those potentially discovering irrelevant information. Relying on Rule 30(c), the court explained: "When the
objection involves a claim of privilege, a strict application of this
34. Prior to its 1972 amendment, Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
began: "Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the
trial under the provisions of Rule 43(b)." FED:R. CIV.P. 30(c), 48 F.R.D. 459, 466 (1970).
The amended Rule reads: "Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed
as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence." FED.R.
CIV.P. 30(c).
35. 28 U.S.C. app. Rule 30(c) note (1976) (Advisory Committee-1972 Amendment).
36. FED.R. CIV.P. 30(c).
37. 64 F.R.D. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).
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rule would undermine the values thereby pr~tected."~'
The court
found, however, that the controverted questions involved "no real
claim of privilege" and held that "[wlhere, as here, the objection
is merely based on assertions of irrelevance, the rule should be
strictly applied.
Similarly, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, I ~ c . , ~the
O court
explained that "disclosure would undermine the protections afforded by the privilege" and that "the general rules as to the
scope of discovery as set out heretofore excludes [sic] discovery
of privileged matter."41
Because privileged matter has been judicially exempted from
the provisions of Rule 30(c), courts have approved refusals to
answer questions seeking privileged information. In Perrignon v.
Bergen Brunswig C ~ r p . , the
' ~ court stated that the party seeking
to prevent disclosure of a privileged communication could have
either sought a Rule 26(c) protective order prior to the deposition,
or terminated the existing deposition and sought a protective
order pursuant to Rule 30(d).43Since the party seeking to prevent
the disclosure had not applied for either type of protective order,
the court suggested that "[alt the very least, [counsel] should
have advised [the deponent] not to answer the question^."^^
Perrignon is not a new application of the discovery rules to
privileged testimony. More than twenty-five years ago, the plaintiff in a libel action moved to limit the scope of a deposition,
asserting that many of the questions asked infringed upon her
constitutional immunity as a United States Senator. The court
ruled that one may properly refuse to answer questions seeking
privileged information:
As a matter of general principle, it is most difficult for the
court to rule on the question of privilege in the abstract. The
normal procedure, and, the court feels, the proper one to be
followed in this case, is for the examination to proceed, the
plaintiff to refuse to answer those questions for which refusals
Id. at 431.
Id.
74 F.R.D. 80 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
Id. at 85.
77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 461. Although the party objected to the questions asked, the court found
that it had failed to take "reasonable and available steps to prevent disclosure, [which]
constituted a voluntary consent to disclosure of part of the privileged communication."
Id. at 460. The court emphasized, however, that there is no per se rule that a party waives
a privilege by failing to seek a protective order. Id. at 461.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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she asserts privilege, and then for the matter to be submitted
to a court for ruling on the specific questions disputed.45

The distinction between treatment of irrelevant testimony
and privileged information is sound. The general function of privilege is to prevent disclosure of certain protected communications
and thereby promote complete candor in certain necessary or
intimate communications.4s Once disclosure occurs, the policy
behind the privilege is thwarted. Special protections at the deposition stage are necessary to the maintenance of the privilege. On
the other hand, the policy behind the relevance standard exists
primarily to encourage economy in the trial process and to avoid
confusing the trier of fact. Although the discovery of irrelevant
testimony may result in some wasted time during the deposition
for both parties, simply answering the questions is more efficient
than seeking or defending a Rule 37(a) motion to compel answers.
Moreover, there is little danger of confusing the trier of fact by
the presentation of irrelevant testimony because the trier of fact
is not present at the deposition. In other words, the policy underlying a relevance standard is adequately safeguarded by the inadmissibility of irrelevant evidence at trial, without the need to
enforce the standard during the taking of depositions.

A. Noting Objections
The proper procedure for noting objections to questions
asked a t oral deposition was outlined more than twenty-five years
ago in Bunco Nacional de Credito Ejidal v. Bank of America
. ~ ~ pointing out that
National Trust & Savings A s s ~ c i a t i o n After
the discovery rules contemplate a liberal construction of
"relevancy," the court dictated the procedure for recording objections:
If deponent objects to the questions asked, the proper procedure
is for him to answer and note his objections in the deposition. . . . At any time during the taking of the deposition the
deponent or any party, upon a showing that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass or oppress, may move the court to
terminate or limit the examination. Rule 30(d). These safe45. Smith v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 514, 515 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
46. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
§ 2285 (rev. 1961).
47. 11 F.R.D.497 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
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guards, the first of logic, the others of procedure should suffice
to protect a party who is objecting in good faith.48
The procedure outlined in Bunco Nacionul has consistently
been recognized as the proper way to object to deposition questions.*' As explained by Professor Wright, "If there is objection
to a question, the reporter will simply note the objection in the
transcript and the witness will answer the question despite the
obje~tion."~~
The requirement that a deponent answer questions despite
objection stems from the sound policy favoring judicial economy.
As explained by one court, "This approach conserves the parties
or witnesses' time and money, as well as judicial resources, and
Moreover, by simply recogexpedites the trial of the law~uit."~'
nizing that objections on relevancy or other grounds will be preserved in the record for consideration at trial, counsel can obviate
the need for repeated depositions of the same witness or timeconsuming and expensive rulings by the court on matters that can
easily be resolved at trial.
Strict adherence to the Federal Rules thereby eliminates the
use of refusals to answer questions as a dilatory tactic during
discovery, while providing adequate protection against the prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence at trial. This protection is
complemented by the economic protections provided in Rule
37(a).

B. Award of Costs and Fees
In addition to motions to compel answers, the Federal Rules
and corresponding judicial interpretations provide a collateral
enforcement mechanism. Rule 37(a)(4) provides that upon the
granting of a motion to compel an answer, "the party or deponent
48. Id. at 499 (citation omitted).
49. See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977); W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Preyer v. United States
Lines, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v.
Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper
Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446 (D.D.C. 1965).
50. C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF FEDERAL
COURTS
8 84, at 420 (3d ed. 1976)
(footnote omitted). Professor Wright comments that this procedure is an "important
exception" to the general rule that a t depositions the examination and cross-examination
proceeds "in the same fashion as at a trial." Id. See also Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74
F.R.D. 518, 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (quoting Professor Wright); Dellefield v. Blockdel
Realty Co., 40 F. Supp. 212, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
51. Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446,449
(D.D.C. 1965).
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whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney
advising such conduct or both of them" may be required to pay
the costs of bringing the motion, including attorneys' fees, unless
there is substantial justification for the c ~ n d u c t Thus,
. ~ ~ one
whose conduct "impose[s] unnecessary and unreasonable expense upon the adverse party and . . . delay[s] the proceedings"
must pay those expenses.53
Adequate protection is given the deponent who refuses to
answer the question in the good faith belief that the question
seeks privileged information or is asked in bad faith. Expenses are
not awarded if the party or deponent's opposition to or filing of a
motion to compel an answer is "substantially justified" or the
court finds "that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust."54If, however, the filing of or opposition to the motion is
without substantial j u s t i f i c a t i ~ n ,the
~ ~ Rule provides that the
court shall award costs of the motion.56One court held that this
"rule imposes a mandatory duty upon the Court to impose the
sanctions therein pr~vided."~'On the other hand, at least one
court has viewed these sanctions as discretionary. That court
ordered each party to bear its own costs of the motion, despite a
finding that one party acted without substantial ju~tification.~~
The better interpretation of the Rule is the former-expenses
should always be awarded absent a showing of substantial justification. This interpretation advances the emerging trend to utilize
Rule 37 sanctions as a deterrent to discovery abuses,5gand recognizes the ineffectiveness of withholding sanctions in the hope that
the parties will comply with the discovery rules in the future.6uIn
either event, however, the award of expenses is occasioned only
in response to a motion to compel answers or a protective order
under Rules 26(c) or 30(d), both of which incorporate the costs
and fees provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) Regardless of whether costs
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4).
53. Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
54. FED.R. CIV.P. 37(a)(4). See also Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367,368 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
55. The courts have applied the substantial justification standard on a case-by-case
basis without attempting to define the term.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4).
57. Palma v. Luke Waukomis Dev. Co., 48 F.R.D. 366, 369 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
58. Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446,44950 (D.D.C. 1965).
59. See Discovery Sanctions, supra note 11, a t 1044-54.
60. Id. a t 1040-41.
61. Cf. Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943,947 (4th Cir. 1965) (expenses not awarded
where no order was sought, focusing on the remedial rather than the deterrent effect of
the sanctions).
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and fees awards are imposed as a remedy or a deterrent, their
effectiveness is enhanced by the judge's discretion to impose
them upon the party at fault, whether that be the deponent, the
party himself, or one or more of the attorneys involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practice of instructing a deponent not to answer certain
questions in a depositon needs no further proscription in the Federal Rules. The Rules and decisions interpreting them provide
adequate protections from abuses of the discovery process. If a
question is asked in bad faith or with a purpose to "annoy, embarrass, or oppress" the deponent or opposing party, the deponent
may refuse to answer the question and apply for a protective
order. Adequate protection is given against an award of costs and
fees by the "substantial justification" provision of Rule 37(a)(4).
Similar protections are afforded privileged information. This
approach minimizes judicial interference. A sound reading of the
Rules suggests that courts should be involved in the taking of
depositions only to issue protective orders or compel answers.BZ
The taking of oral depositions is designed to be a cooperative,
self-regulating discovery
The scope of the deposition is limited only by the rules of privilege and the standards for the issuance of a protective order. Questions objected to on grounds of
relevancy are not within these exceptions, and should be answered, subject to recording the objection in the transcript. Express provision is made for the preservation of objections made
during the deposition, and the resulting exclusion, if appropriate,
of the question or answer at trial. Both the courts and the litigators must become aware of and implement the procedures and
sanctions provided by the Rules to insure efficient discovery of
information with minimal use of dilatory tactics and judicial intervention.

Kent E. Cammack
62. Cf. Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237,240 (D.R.I. 1957) (court may not exercise
its power to limit the deposition absent a "showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress").
63. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
("Rule 30(d) is the only authority allowing the interruption of a deposition.").

